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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
UINTAH COUNTY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
JIMMIE N. REIDHEAD, NYLE C. 
BIGELOW, GLEN MCKEE, Uintah 
County Commissioners, WESTERN 
SURETY CO., Bondsman 
Defendants/Appellees 
CASE NO. 900490-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The Honorable Dennis L. Draney Presiding 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah State Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(j) having been transferred 
from the Utah State Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
1. Are the Defendants as a matter of law entitled to Summary 
Judgment on the issue of good faith alone in view of the fact that 
part of the relief sought was to enjoin Defendants from maintaining 
the road in question when an issue was presented and undecided as 
to whether the road is a dedicated road or not? 
2. In view of the evidence presented, showing that the 
decision to pave the road was not made in an open meeting, that the 
matter was not included in the budget itself; that Commissioner 
Reidhead alone derived benefit therefore does this present a 
question as to whether the action was taken in good faith? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was filed pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12 
by the Uintah County Attorney in behalf of Uintah County against 
Defendants, Uintah County Commissioners and their bondsman, praying 
for Judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Uintah 
County, State of Utah, in the amount of $20,000.00 and an 
injunction to restrain the Commissioners from further paving a lane 
which lead to Commissioner Reidhead's property, alleging the same 
was a private road. The matter was heard on April 10, 1990, before 
Judge Dennis L^  Draney, and Summary Judgment rendered in favor of 
said Defendants from which Judgment Plaintiff Appeals. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of statutes and rules pertinent to resolving 
this case will be cited here and verbatim text included in an 
Addendum attached hereto. These are as follows: 
1. Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12 
2. Utah Code Annotated 17-5-16(3) 
3. Utah Code Annotated 27-12-89 
4. Utah Code Annotated 27-15-3 
5. Utah Code Annotated 52-4-1 through 7 
6. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arose out of the paving of a lane of Commissioner 
Jimmie N. Reidhead by the County on August 24, 1989. Subsequently, 
the Uintah County Attorney, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-
12, filed an action to recover damages in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court in the amount of $20,000.00 and enjoin the County 
from maintaining the road, alleging that the same was a private 
driveway and not a public road. The matter was heard on April 10, 
1990, on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment was 
rendered for Defendants, the Court holding that Defendants acted 
in good faith and that it was not necessary to rule on the question 
of whether the road was dedicated or not. Said Judgment being 
entered on June 4, 1990, from this Judgment Plaintiff Appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant will argue that the Court was in error in ruling 
that the issue be decided on the question of good faith and that 
it was not necessary to rule upon the issue as to whether the road 
was dedicated or not. Appellant will argue in connection 
therewith, that inasmuch as Appellant requested an injunction to 
restrain the County from maintaining the road and legal issue was 
ventured requiring a ruling despite whether said Defendants might 
claim immunity from monetary damages under the good faith 
exception. Appellant asserts that the record will show disputed 
facts on this issue that preclude the awarding of Summary Judgment. 
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The Defendants will further argue that in view of the fact 
that the decision to pave the road was not made in a regular public 
meeting of the Commission, at a meeting that was not held in 
compliance of the open meeting law, that the same was not regularly 
budgeted in the County Budget, that Commissioner Reidhead benefited 
therefrom and an issue is raised as to the good faith performance 
of the Commission in paving the road. 
ARGUMENT 
Before responding specifically to precise points of issue, 
Appellant calls attention to the following general principle that 
will apply to both points of the Argument ventured respecting a 
Summary Judgment, and in regard thereto it will be noted that 
pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that 
the same will lie: 
f,[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers, 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." 
Further it has been established by the Court that in rendering 
such a Judgment the Court is not to determine the weight of the 
evidence or the credibility of the witnesses (Singleton v. 
Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 291, 431 P2d 126, Sandburg v. Klien, 576 P2d 
1201), nor is it to determine what the facts are, but only whether 
there is a material issue of fact (Hill ex rel Fogel v. Grand 
Central , Inc. . 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P2d 150), and any issue of doubt 
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is to be resolved in favor of the opposing party (Bowen v. Riverton 
City, 656 P2d 434), having prefaced the Argument, Appellant will 
proceed to discuss his respective points of issue. 
POINT I 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN RULING THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT COULD BE 
RENDERED TO DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THERE WAS NO 
SHOWING THAT THEY ACTED IN BAD FAITH AND THE COURT NEED NOT 
CONSIDER THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE ROAD WAS A DEDICATED ROAD OR 
NOT. 
In noting the Court's ruling it held that the only question 
that need be decided is whether Defendants, as public officers, 
acted in "good faith" and it need not consider the question of 
whether the road in question is dedicated or not (Court's Ruling 
Page 2). This disregards the fact that Appellant (Plaintiff) in 
its complaint requested that Defendant Commissioners be enjoined 
"from further expenditure on said road for either construction or 
maintenance of the same" (Prayer of Plaintiff's Complaint). 
Furthermore this prayer is in keeping with the portion of the law 
under which the said action was filed which provides that: 
"Whenever any Board of County Commissioners 
without authority of law order any money paid 
for any purpose and such money shall have been 
actually paid, or whenever any other county 
officer has drawn any warrant in his own favor 
for any other person without being authorized 
thereto, by the Board of County Commissioners 
or by law and the same shall have been paid, 
the County Attorney of such County upon 
receiving notice shall commence suit in the 
name of the County to restrain payment of the 
same. No order of the Board of County 
Commissioners is necessary in order to maintain 
such action." [italics added] 
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Noting this section implicit under the same action is the duty 
of the County Attorney not only to recover monetary damages, but 
to restrain further expenditure and in ruling solely on the 
question of monetary relief, the Court left unanswered, and at 
issue the question as to whether the expenditure was made on a 
public road or private driveway and thus a legitimate public 
expenditure of public monies. 
Noting the Courtfs decisions with respect to the law on this 
matter the cases (Snvder v Merkley, 693 P2d 64, Salt Lake County 
v Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P 1075) are precedent merely as to the 
question of monetary liability, and certainly do not hold on the 
question as to injunctive relief. 
Like the record very definitely shows issues of material fact 
raised on the question as to whether the road is a dedicated public 
road, the Affidavits of George Houston and Homer Lee contradict the 
testimony (of Nyle Bigelow and Jimmie N. Reidhead if hearsay) in 
the depositions. Plaintiff/Appel lant has taken issue and cited 
precedent as to the "adopted "B" road" map (Thompson v Condas, 27 
Utah 2d 129, 493 P2d 639), also as to the adopting map (Plaintiff's 
Memorandum) Bonner v Sandburg, 18 Utah 2d 140). Similarly in the 
case of Peterson v Combo, 20 U2d 376, 438 P2d 545, the Court held 
that more than mere resolution was required to make a road a public 
road and in connection therewith 23 AmJur 2d, Dedication, Section 
24(P27): 
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"The mere exhibition of a plat or map showing 
the location of areas proposed for public use 
does not constitute a dedication. Ordinarily 
there must be in addition an acceptance by the 
public to make the dedication complete." 
Noting this fact, a mere acceptance of a map of several roads 
approved for "B" road funding does not amount to such a dedication 
and while the same does not apply to "B" roads, by implication the 
statement of the law on Class "D" roads by inference and analogy 
indicates department policy toward such funding when it is noted: 
"This department shall scribe each road shown 
on this map on its own County map series but 
shall not be responsible for the validity of 
any such road nor it being inventoried." 
Similarly, the Memorandum raises the issue and cites precedent 
to show that a road used as a private easement cannot acquire 
dedication for such use (Gilmor v Carter. 15 Utah 2d 280). 
By issue, noting the fact that the road was used for the 
benefit of Commissioner Reidhead the circumstances raises the 
question of whether Equitable Estoppel might raise an issue as to 
whether it be ruled a dedicated road. All of which present issues 
of material fact that preclude Summary Judgment. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD PRESENTS ISSUES OVER MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER THE 
COMMISSIONERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN RULING TO PAVE THE ROAD. 
It is conceded that as to monetary damages that unless there 
is shown by the pleading that the Commissioners acted in good 
faith, there can be no monetary damages incurred by the Defendants. 
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In making such a ruling and concluding that the evidence showed 
nothing to indicate they acted otherwise, the Court no doubt 
misconstrued the rule in Salt Lake v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P 
1075 and Snyder v Merkley, 693 P2d 64, for in both of those cases, 
the individual litigants derived no personal increment or gain from 
the Commissioners action, while in the instant case Commissioner 
Reidhead and he alone benefited from the action in paving the road. 
Similarly, the depositions of both Commissioner McKee and Bigelow 
were aware of this fact (Nyle C. Bigelow Deposition Page 8 & 9). 
Similarly, while this is a discretionary function and in the 
absence of the showing of fraud or bad faith liability does not lie 
for unauthorized expenditure of public monies. There are facts 
from the pleading that show genuine issues of good faith first; the 
record of depositions show that the action was not taken at a 
regular County Commissioner's Meeting but at a road meeting 
(Deposition Nyle C. Bigelow Page 8 and Deposition Glen C. McKee 
Page 4). Despite the testimony as to the manner in which the road 
meetings were held the Agenda of said road meeting and the minutes 
thereto, verified by Gary McClellan, show the open meetings law was 
not complied with in deciding to pave this road (Copy of minutes 
Agenda Road Meeting August 8, 1989 Addendum, Exhibit "A"), there 
is no showing on the Agenda that the paving of the road was to be 
considered, no record of vote thereon, and notation of people 
present, and while the matter of open meetings does not enter into 
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this discussion directly, it has been raised in the depositions and 
raises an issue of a lack of good faith that should preclude 
Summary Judgment. Similarly, it is noted that no notation is made 
of the road in the Department Budge (see budget attached) that the 
Department "willy-nilly" used the budget to fit projects in and 
that no road book has been kept for such expenditures as required 
by law (Utah Code Annotated 17-5-16(3)); that the extension of the 
lane was made a part of paving the Mitchell Road (see projects "B" 
road funds - Paul Feltch's Deposition Page 28). Also as to 
estimates of the cost (cost estimate Addendum Exhibit "B" and 
Exhibit "C") documents certified by Paul Feltch. 
Noting all of these matters, that the same were only produced 
shortly before the hearing, each of them raise material issues as 
to whether the action of paving the road was ventured in good 
faith. Similarly, conceding that the action was undertaken as a 
discretionary function, the Court has said that even in performing 
a discretionary function, that "discretion does not mean absolute 
or arbitrary power." The discretion must be exercised in a 
reasonable manner, and not maliciously, wantonly, and arbitrarily 
to the wrong and injury of another (Murphy v Grand County, 1 Utah 
2d 412, 68 P2d 677 at 426 8 P2d 677). Surely where the facts of 
record show that paving of the road in question was decided on at 
a road meeting not noticed out, for the benefit of one of the 
Commissioners, not budgeted, with no minutes of record of a record 
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vote, not placed on the Agenda at a meeting of the Commissioners 
Office indicate an arbitrary decision on the part of the Commission 
in outrageously exercising a discretionary function; and raises 
therewith a question of good faith performance. 
Similarly, there is precedent from cases outside the 
Jurisdiction on the good faith rule will support the question that 
the Commission in the instant situation breached the good faith 
rule, particularly a North Carolina Court addressed the issue in 
the light of the good faith immunity where the Mayor was sued for 
funds spent on contracts not publicly bid, and in the face of a 
jury verdict that found the Mayor "unlawfully, willfully and 
knowingly let"..."(the contract) with the intent to evade the law 
with regard to advertisement and letting of municipal contracts 
Despite the Mayor's claim that he owed no public liability 
because "he did not act corruptly or with malice" the Court in this 
instance held that because Plaintiffs were not seeking recovery as 
individuals but acting "in behalf" of the city the case stands on 
a different principle, to-wit: 
"Where public funds are wrongfully, willfully, 
and knowingly disbursed by municipal officers 
without adequate consideration moving to the 
municipality and with intent to evade the 
law...those responsible.. .may be required to 
make good the loss to the public treasury." 
(Moore v Lambeth, 207 N.C. 23, 175 S.E. 714) 
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While this precedent has not been frequently followed by 
analogy it might be applied to the present situation where a road 
that accrues to the benefit of a Commissioner alone is paved at 
public expense on a road that leads solely to his property, said 
action taken outside a public meeting, without notice or agenda, 
or minutes that indicate who were present certainly the action 
appears evasive of the law, nd there are material issues that 
should preclude awarding Summary Judgment. In this instance the 
evasion relates not to awarding a contract, but paving a road to 
the increment of one of the parties. If it be shown that such 
action were deliberate, then the shield to good faith will be 
removed. 
Similarly, there are precedents that indicate "that shields 
public officials from civil liability where conduct does not 
violate rights which1' a reasonable person would have known (Harlow 
v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800). 
The doctrine removes the "shield" when the official 
"knowingly" violates a statutory standard and while this doctrine 
has been applied only to "monetary damages" in civil rights actions 
(Sampson v King, 693 F2d 566, Green v White, 693 F2d 45) by analogy 
if the material issues raised in the pleadings could be established 
in the trial, a question as to whether the Commissioners did act 
in good faith could be raised, and from the facts alluded to in the 
pleadings the Plaintiff ought not to be precluded that opportunity. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant argues in conclusion that Summary Judgment is only 
to be awarded in cases where from the pleadings when viewed in the 
most favorable light there is no material issue of fact to be 
resolved and the prevailing party is entitled to a judgement as a 
matter of law. From the argument set forth there are issues of 
material tact, whether the road in question was a dedicated road, 
and whether the Commission be enjoined from maintaining the same, 
presenting therewith an issue of a material fact relevant to the 
relief sought and therefore on that precludes Summary Judgment. 
Similarly, as noted herein considering that the paving of the 
road accrued to the benefit of Commissioner Reidhead alone that 
action was taken on the same otherwise than at a regular County 
Commission Meeting, of which the minutes disclose that no agenda 
was published, no record of vote taken, no record of parties 
present, and with no budget authorization of the road, there are 
evidences sufficient to raise a question of whether the 
Commissioners acted in good faith hence, the action of the Court 
in awarding Summary Judgment should be overruled. 
DATED this j£ day of October, 1990. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Lynn 
J. Lund, Attorney for Defendants/Appellees, 230 South 500 East 
#210, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
DATED this -/ day of October, 1990. 
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COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 17-5-12 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 502; C.L. 
1917, § 1378; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-9. 
17-5-10, 17-5-11. Repealed. 
Repeals. Sections 17-5-10 and 17-5-11 (R.S. 
1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 503, 504; C.L. 1917, 
§§ 1379, 1380; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5.10, 
19-5-11), relating to personal interests of mem-
bers of the board of county commissioners in 
county contracts, franchises or licenses, were 
repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 128, § 15. For 
present provisions, see § 67-16-1 et seq. 
17-5-12. Moneys unlawfully paid — Recovery — Restrain-
ing payment. 
Whenever any board of county commissioners shall without authority of 
law order any money paid for any purpose and such money shall have been 
actually paid, or whenever any other county officer has drawn any warrant in 
his own favor or in favor of any other person without being authorized thereto 
by the board of county commissioners or by law and the same shall have been 
paid, the county attorney of such county shall institute suit in the name of the 
county against such person or such officer and his official bondsman to recover 
the money so paid, and when the money has not been paid on such order or 
warrants, the county attorney of such county upon receiving notice thereof 
shall commence suit in the name of the county to restrain the payment of the 
same; no order of the board of county commissioners shall be necessary in 
order to maintain either of such actions. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, $ 506; C.L. 
1917, § 1382; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-12. 
Cross-References. — Uniform fiscal proce-
dures for counties, § 17-36-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Personal liability of commissioners. 
Procedure for bringing action. 
Personal liability of commissioners. 
County commissioners could not be held per-
sonally liable, in absence of fraud or corrup-
tion, for unauthorized allowance of claim for 
publication of a list of delinquent taxes without 
having first invited bids for publication since 
the hearing and determination by commis-
sioners of justness or validity of claim in the 
question required exercise of judicial, or, at 
least, quasi-judicial functions of board. Salt 
Lake County v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P. 
1075 (1911). 
Procedure for bringing action. 
In an action under this section to recover un-
lawfully paid money, the county attorney of 
the county wherein it was alleged that the 
funds were illegally expended must be a party 
to bring action, and action must be in the name 
of the county. Snyder v. Cook (Utah 1984) 688 
P.2d 496. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties § 98. 
Key Numbers. — Counties *= 59. 
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COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 17-5-16 
(8) Authenticate with his signature and the seal of the county clerk the 
proceedings of the board whenever the same shall be ordered published. 
(9) Authenticate with his signature and the seal of the county clerk all 
ordinances or laws passed by the board, and record the same at length in 
the ordinance book. 
(10) Record all orders levying taxes. 
(11) Perform all other duties requried by law or by any rule or order of 
the board. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 609; C.L. Cross-References. — Duties of county clerk 
1917, § 1385; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-15. generally, § 17-20-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Record of proceedings. face although the county clerk made record of 
Under this section, an order of the board of board'6 proceedings instead of the county audi-
equalization directing abatement of assess- tor. Board of Educ. v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 
ment under § 59-7-1 et seq. is not void on its 280 P. 1065 (1929). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties § 141. 
Key Numbers. — Counties *=> 89. 
17-5-16. Books to be kept 
The board must cause to be kept: 
(1) A minute book, in which must be recorded all orders and decisions 
made by the board and the daily proceedings had at all regular and 
special meetings. 
(2) An allowance book, in which must be recorded all orders for the 
allowance of money from the county treasury, to whom made and on what 
account, dating, numbering and indexing the same through each year. 
(3) A road book, containing all proceedings and adjudications relating 
to the establishment, maintenance, charge and discontinuance of roads 
and road districts, and all contracts and other matters pertaining thereto. 
(4) A franchise book, containing all franchises granted by the board, for 
what purpose, the length of time, and to whom granted, the amount of 
bond and license tax required or other consideration to be paid. 
(5) An ordinance book, in which must be entered all ordinances or laws 
duly passed by the board. 
(6) A warrant book, to be kept by the county auditor, in which must be 
entered in the order of drawing all warrants drawn on the treasurer, with 
their number and reference to the order on the minute book, with date, 
amount, on what account and the name of the payee. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 510, books showing recepits and disbursements, 
1135; C.L. 1917, §§ 1386,2821; R.S. 1933 & C. § 17-19-6. 
1943, 19-5-16. Enactment of ordinances generally, 
Cross-References. — Auditor to maintain § 17-15-1. 
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HIGHWAY CODE 2742-89 
(3) The State Road Commission may furnish and install lighting sys-
tems for such highways, but their operation and maintenance shall be the 
responsibility of the city or town. 
(4) If new storm sewer facilities are necessary in the construction and 
maintenance of such highways, the cost of such facilities shall be borne by 
the state and the city or town in such proportion as may be mutually 
agreed upon between the State Road Commission and the highway au-
thorities of the city or town. 
(5) The State Road Commission is authorized to regulate the location 
and construction of approach roads and driveways entering upon any such 
highway, but the commission may delegate the administration of such 
regulations to the highway authorities of the city or town. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 88. ities were transferred to the Department of 
Compiler's Notes. — The State Road Com- Transportation by Laws 1975, ch 204, §§ 17 
mission was abolished and its assets and liabil- and 18. See §§ 63-49-13 and 63-49-14. 
ARTICLE 6 
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR HIGHWAY 
PURPOSES 
27-12-89. Public use constituting dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the 
use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare 
for a period of ten years. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 89. 
Cross-References. — Dedication by plat, 
§ 57-5-4. 
ANALYSIS 
Burden of proof. 
Change in highway. 
Control by landowners. 
Estoppel 
Intent of landowner. 
—Necessary. 
-Not necessary. 
Tubhc" defined. 
Rights granted to public 
Rights of subsequent grantees. 
Sufficiency of proof of dedication 
Thoroughfare" and "public thoroughfare" dis-
tinguished 
**tle not passed. 
Burden of proof. 
^phere claim is made that a highway has 
Deen dedicated to public use, there is a pre-
•J^ption in favor of the property owner and 
«* burden of establishing public use for the 
required period of time is on those claiming it. 
Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow 
Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981). 
Change in highwayv 
A public highway over public lands is estab-
lished, although there has been no official ac-
ceptance, where it has been used for longer 
than ten years, if travel has remained substan-
tially unchanged, and practical identity of road 
preserved, that is sufficient, although there 
may have been slight deviations from the com-
mon way Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. 
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 (1929). 
Slight change in course of highway or of its 
location that does not materially change or af-
fect the general course thereof or affect its loca-
tion, nor break or change the continuity of 
travel or use, does not constitute abandonment 
or affect public nature of highway. Sullivan v. 
Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 (1930). 
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Control by landowners. 
No dedication was shown under identically 
worded predecessor section where it appeared 
that an alleyway which had more or less been 
used by the public at will for a number of years 
had from time to time been closed by the abut-
ting owners, who had at all times exercised 
control over it. Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 
Utah 252, 75 P. 620 (1904). 
Estoppel. 
Municipality may be estopped from asserting 
dedication by acts and conduct that have been 
relied on by others to their prejudice and, like-
wise, private individual may be estopped in the 
same way where he stands by and permits 
others to improve land claimed to have been 
dedicated. Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112 
Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947). 
Intent of landowner. 
—Necessary. 
In order for a private road to become a public 
thoroughfare there must be evidence of intent 
by the owner to dedicate the road to a public 
use and an acceptance by the public. Such in-
tent may be inferred from declarations, acts or 
circumstances and use by the general public. 
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 
426 (1964) (but see cases noted under "—Not 
necessary" below). 
For cases discussing landowner's intent to 
dedicate road to public use, see Wilson v. Hull, 
7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799 (1890); Whittaker v. Fer-
guson, 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898); Schettler 
v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901); 
Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 75 P. 
620 (1904); Brown v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 
36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740 (1909); Morris v. 
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916); Wil-
liam J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 
51 Utah 178, 169 P. 459 (1917); Barboglio v. 
Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385 (1923). 
—Not necessary. 
The determination that a roadway has been 
continuously used by members of the general 
public for at least ten years is the sole require-
ment for it to become a public road; it is not 
necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer 
the road to the public. Thurman v. Byram, 626 
P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). 
To establish a dedication of a road to a public 
use, it is not necessary to prove landowner's 
intent to dedicate the road to a public use. Leo 
M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 
639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981). 
"Public" defined. 
Owners of property abutting or straddling 
rural road and their personal visitors were not 
members of public generally within this provi-
sion; burden of proving real public use of that 
road continuously for ten years was not met in 
suit by subdividers who sought to establish 
that the road had become a public thorough-
fare. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 
P.2d 545 (1968). 
Rights granted to public. 
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under 
Townsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq.), after 
alleged dedication thereof as public street, so 
that only right that public could have acquired 
would be right to easement across strip for 
traveling purposes, and only additional right 
contiguous property owners might acquire 
would be right of ingress to and egress from 
their property. Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 
112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947). 
Rights of subsequent grantees. 
Where land is dedicated by owner as high-
way and is accepted by public as such, all sub-
sequent grantees of abutting lands are bound 
by dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 
64 P. 955 (1901). 
Sufficiency of proof of dedication. 
Highway over privately owned ground will 
be deemed dedicated or abandoned to the pub-
lic use when the public has continuously used 
it as a thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 
(1916). 
Mere use by public of private alley in com-
mon with owners of alley does not show a dedi-
cation thereof to public use, or vest any right in 
public to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 
2d 340, 273 P.2d 720 (1954). 
Though dedication of one's land to public use 
should not be lightly regarded, where a nar-
row, private dead-end street was used by 
neighboring residents and the general public 
without interference for at least 25 years, and 
where the city had platted it as a public street 
in 1915 and had thereafter paved it and main-
tained a public street sign at its entrance, and 
where plaintiff who owned the fee simple inter-
est in the land on which the street was situated 
had not paid any taxes on the street property 
for 25 years, this combination of factors was 
sufficient to justify finding that the street had 
been dedicated to public use. Bonner v. 
Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646 (1966). 
Clear and convincing quantum and quality 
of proof is required for the establishment of a 
public thoroughfare or taking of another'* 
property. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129. 
493 P.2d 639 (1972). 
Where the trial court found that public baa-
used north-south road for 12 years and thai 
during this time, the road was ten feet wide, 
and the court found that there was insufficient 
use of an east-west road by the public to ma** 
it a public road, these findings of fact sup-
ported bv substantial evidence, co mP e l , e?1 i r 
holding that the north-south road was a puwic 
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highway ten feet wide and that no public high-
way existed on the east-west road Western 
Kane County Special Serv Dist No 1 v Jack-
son Cattle Co, 744 P 2d 1376 (Utah 1987) 
For cases finding sufficient evidence to sup 
port finding of dedication to public use, 6ee Sul 
hvan v Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P 954 
(1930), Jeremy v Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 
P 2d 420 (1941), Boyer v Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 
326 P 2d 107 (1958), Clark v Erekson, 9 Utah 
2d 212, 341 P2d 424 (1959) 
"Thoroughfare" and "public thorough-
fare" distinguished. 
Under identically worded predecessor see-
Am Jur. 2d — 39 Am Jur 2d Highways, 
Streets, and Bridges § 25 et seq 
ANALYSIS 
Abutting owners' rights 
Bndges 
Notice of abandonment required 
Platted but unused streets 
Power of city to abandon 
Requisites for abandonment 
Abutting owners' rights 
While public may abandon street or highway 
insofar as it affects rights of public therein, 
such abandonment, however, will not affect 
rights of abutting owner with respect to use of 
easement for mgTess and egress to and from 
his premises Hague v Juab County Mill & 
Elevator Co , 37 Utah 290, 107 P 249 (1910) 
Where property is sold with reference to a 
map or plat showing it to abut on a public 
highway, this constitutes an implied covenant 
that high* ay will not be obstructed or inter-
fered with by grantor While highway by aban-
donment may pass out of jurisdiction of local 
authorities, rights of abutting owners will not 
°e affected Tuttle v Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 
12$ P 959 (1912) 
^ndges. 
Bndge owned by county was an essential 
tion, a "thoroughfare" was a place or way 
through which there is passing or travel It be-
came a "public thoroughfare" when the public 
acquired a general right of passage Moms v 
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P 1127 (1916) 
Title not passed. 
Where owner of land deeded it to city for 
public use but city never accepted it, no dedica-
tion took place and claim of purchaser from 
city was invalid as against subsequent pur-
chaser from original owner of land William J 
Lemp Brewing Co v P J Moran, Inc , 51 Utah 
176, 169 P 459 (1917) 
C.J.S. — 39A C J S Highways § 15 
Key Numbers. — Highways «= 6(1) 
part of road and could not be abandoned except 
as provided by statute Adney v State Rd 
Comm'n, 67 Utah 567, 248 P 811 (1926) 
Notice of abandonment required 
County commissioners may not order aban-
donment of a county road unless notice thereof 
is given according to § 27-12-102 4 Ercan-
bmck v Judd, 524 P 2d 595 (Utah 1974) 
Platted but unused streets. 
Corporation was able to give good title to 
land platted for streets and alleyway6 but 
never used as such, since under proviso in for-
mer law, road not used or worked for five years 
ceased to be a highway Mallory v Taggart, 24 
Utah 2d 267, 470 P 2d 254 (1970) 
Power of city to abandon. 
City, as dedicator of strip acquired under 
Townsite Act (43 U S C § 718 et seq ) as pub-
lic street, could vacate or revoke dedication 
even without enactment of ordinance, unless 
dedication was accepted by public use, subject 
to rights acquired by reliance on dedication 
Premium Oil Co v Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 
187 P 2d 199 (1947) 
Requisites for abandonment 
Where a high^av is dedicated as a public 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
27-12-90. Highways once established continue until aban-
doned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until 
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction 
over any such highway, or by other competent authority. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, & 90. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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27-15-2. Designation of class D roads. 
(1) Each road is designated as part of the highway and road system within 
the state of Utah with the same force and effect as if the road had been 
included within this system upon its being first established or constructed. 
(2) Each road shall also be known as class D road. 
History: C. 1953, 27-15-2, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 9, § 2. 
27-15-3. Maps to be prepared by county — Indication of 
roads. 
(1) Each county shall prepare maps showing to the best of its ability the 
roads within its boundaries which were in existence as of October 21, 1976. 
Preparation of these maps may be done by the county itself or through any 
multi-county planning district in which the county participates. A county 
shall be given a minimum of two years to complete mapping of the roads 
within its boundaries. 
(2) Any road which is established or constructed after October 21, 1976, 
shall similarly be reflected on maps prepared as provided in Subsection (1). 
(3) Upon completion of any map provided for under either Subsection (1) or 
Subsection (2) the county shall provide a copy of it to the Department of 
Transportation. This department shall scribe each road shown on this map on 
its own county map series but shall not be responsible for the validity of any 
such road nor for its being inventoried. The department shall also keep on file 
an historical map record of the roads as so provided by the counties. 
History: C. 1953, 27-15-3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Plats of highways 
1978, ch. 9, § 3; 1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 1. and roads maintained by counties, § 27-12-26. 
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52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense. 
Each day any such person, father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, 
sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousins, mother-in-law, fa-
ther-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law, is 
retained in office by any of said officials shall be regarded as a separate 
offense 
History: L. 1931, ch. 13, § 2; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 49-12-2. 
52-3-3. Penalty. 
Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 13, § 3; R.S. 1933 & C. Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
1943, 49-12-3; L. 1953, ch. 79, § 2. meanors, §§ 76-3 201, 76-3 204, 76-3-301 
52-3-4. Exception in towns. 
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to the employment of uncles, aunts, 
nephews, nieces or cousins. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 13, § 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 49-12-4. 
CHAPTER 4 
OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS 
Section Section 
52-4-1 Declaration of public policy ings excluded — Disruption of 
52-4-2 Definitions meetings 
52-4-3 Meetings open to the public — Ex- 52-4-6 Public notice of meetings 
ceptions 52-4-7 Minutes of open meetings — Public 
52-4-4 Closed meeting held upon vote of records — Recording of meetings 
members — Business — Reasons 52-4-8 Suit to void final action — Limita-
for meeting recorded tion — Exceptions 
52-4-5 Purposes of closed meetings — 52-4-9 Enforcement of chapter — Suit to 
Chance meetings and social meet- compel compliance 
52-4-1. Declaration of public policy. 
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the state, 
its agencies and political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the peo-
ple's business It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and 
that their deliberations be conducted openly. 
History: L. 1955, ch. 133, § 1; 1977, ch. County commissioners, board meetings pub-
*7r § l- he, § 17-5-8 
nan!?8 e r e n c e s * r 9 e m e U j r y m a i n t e" County improvement district board of 
*£<* commissioners, board meetings public,
 t r u s t e e s meetings, § 17-6-3 4 
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Judicial Council meetings, Rules of Judicial 
Administration, Rule 2-103. 
Liquor control commission meetings to be 
open, § 32A-1-6C6). 
Municipal governing bodies, meetings sub-
ject to this chapter, § 10-3-601. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-2, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 180, § 2; 1981, ch. 191, § 1; 1987, 
ch. 86, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective March 16, 1987, substituted 
"chapter" for "act" in the introductory Ian-
State money management council meetings, 
§ 51-7-16. 
State board of financial institutions subject 
to this chapter, § 7-1-203(3). 
guage; substituted "in person" for "corporal in 
Subsection (1); and in the second sentence of 
Subsection (2) substituted "nor any wnferencr 
committee, rules or sifting committee" for or 
rules or sifting committees." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Deliberations. 
ADDUcabilitv Public Service Commission's deliberations 
Deliberations. a r e n o t r e c l u i r e d to ^ °Pen t° t n e public when 
they are part of the "decision making" or judi-
m ? . a ? Iy' • ± i- ii . .i TT. i cial phase of the commission's work. Common Th.s chapter is not applicable to the Utah
 Q rf U t a h U t a h ^ ^ C o m m > 
State Retirement Board. Ellis v. Utah State „
 0 , 1Q1Q ,1Q7Qx 
Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 882 (Utah Ct. App. VM 161Z ( i y / y ) * 
1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Common Cause v. cability of Open-Meeting Legislation to Quasi-
Utah Public Service Commission — The Appli- Judicial Bodies, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 829. 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, with a quorum 
present, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, for the 
purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the public body 
has jurisdiction or advisory power. This chapter shall not apply to chance 
meetings. "Convening," as used in this subsection, means the calling of a 
meeting of a public body by a person or persons authorized to do so for the 
express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that 
public body has jurisdiction. 
(2) "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or 
legislative body of the state or its political subdivisions which consists of 
two or more persons that expends, disburses, or is supported in whole or 
in part by tax revenue and which is vested with the authority to make 
decisions regarding the public's business. "Public body" does not include 
any political party, group, or caucus nor any conference committee, rules 
or sifting committee of the Legislature. 
(3) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership of a public 
body, unless otherwise defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not 
include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no action, 
either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these elected 
officials have jurisdiction. 
222 
OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS 52-4-5 
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public — Exceptions. 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed pursuant to Sections 
52-4-4 and 52-4-5. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Violations, suit to 
1977, ch. 180, § 3. void final action, § 52-4-8 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Public Service Commission. regulations, contracts, or appointments should 
Public Service Commission meetings should be announced or issued in a meeting open to 
be open to public during commission's "mfor- the public Common Cause of Utah v Utah 
mation obtaining" phase, but not during "deci- Pub Serv Comm'n, 598 P2d 1312 (Utah 
sion making" or judicial phase, any final and 1979) 
formal action on ordinances, resolutions, rules, 
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of members — Busi-
ness — Reasons for meeting recorded. 
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
members of the public body present at an open meeting for which notice is 
given pursuant to Section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed 
meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted under Section 52-4-5; pro-
vided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment 
shall be approved at a closed meeting The reason or reasons for holding a 
closed meeting and the vote, either for or against the proposition to hold such 
a meeting, cast by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes of 
the meeting 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any meeting to be 
closed to the public 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-4, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 180, § 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Public Service Commission. regulations, contracts, or appointments should 
Public Service Commission meetings should be announced or issued in a meeting open to 
be open to public during commission's "mfor- the public Common Cause of Utah v Utah 
mation obtaining' phase, but not during "deci- pub Serv Comm'n, 598 P 2d 1312 (Utah 
sion making" or judicial phase, any final and 1979) 
formal action on ordinances, resolutions, rules, 
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance meetings 
and social meetings excluded — Disruption of 
meetings. 
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 52-4-4 for any of the 
following purposes-
(a) discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or 
mental health of an individual, 
(b) strategy sessions with respect to collective bargaining, litigation, or 
purchase of real property, 
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(c) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel or devices; 
and 
(d) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of criminal miscon-
duct. 
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting or a social meeting. 
No chance meeting or social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any person who willfully 
disrupts a meeting to the extent that orderly conduct is seriously compro-
mised. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-5, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 180, § 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of meeting requirement of Sunshine Act, 82 
exemptions, under 5 USCS § 552b(c), to open A.L.R. Fed. 465. 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that are scheduled in 
advance over the course of a year shall give public notice at least once each 
year of its annual meeting schedule as provided in this section. The public 
notice shall specify the date, time, and place of such meetings. 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, 
each public body shall give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the agenda, 
date, time and place of each of its meetings. 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) posting written notice at the principal office of the public body, or if 
no such office exists, at the building where the meeting is to be held; and 
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of general circulation 
within the geographic jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media 
correspondent. 
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is necessary for a public 
body to hold an emergency meeting to consider matters of an emergency or 
urgent nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2) may be disre-
garded and the best notice practicable given. No such emergency meeting of a 
public body shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify all of its 
members and a majority votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-6, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Closed meeting held 
1977, ch. 180, § 6; 1978, ch. 17, § 1. upon vote at open meeting, § 52-4-4. 
Violations, suit to void final action, § 52-4-8 
52-4-7. Minutes of open meetings — Public records — Re-
cording of meetings. 
(1) Written minutes shall be kept of all open meetings. Such minutes shall 
include: 
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting; 
(b) the names of members present and absent; 
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(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided, and a 
record, by individual member, of votes taken; 
(d) the names of all citizens who appeared and the substance in brief of 
their testimony; 
(e) any other information that any member requests be entered in the 
minutes. 
(2) Written minutes shall be kept of all closed meetings. Such minutes shall 
include: 
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting; 
(b) the names of members present and absent; 
(c) the names of all others present except where such disclosure would 
infringe on the confidence necessary to fulfill the original purpose of 
closing the meeting. 
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be available within a reason-
able time after the meeting. 
(4) All or any part of an open meeting may be recorded by any person in 
attendance; provided, the recording does not interfere with the conduct of the 
meeting. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-7, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 180, § 7; 1978, ch. 17, § 2. 
52-4-8. Suit to void final action — Limitation — Excep-
tions. 
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 and 52-4-6 is voidable 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be com-
menced within 90 days after the action except that with respect to any final 
action concerning the issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebted-
ness suit shall be commenced within 30 days after the action. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-8, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 180, § 8; 1978, ch. 17, § 3. 
52-4-9. Enforcement of chapter — Suit to compel compli-
ance. 
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of the state shall enforce this 
chapter. 
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may commence suit in a 
court of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with or enjoin violations 
of this chapter or to determine its applicability to discussions or decisions of a 
public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees and court costs to 
a successful plaintifT. 
History: C. 1953, 52-4-9, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 180, § 9. 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. of Subsection (2)(d), and made minor stylistic 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, changes 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, fc 141; 1988, ch. The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
248, § 8. ter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsec-
Amendment Notes — The 1988 amend- tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection 
mentb) Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April (2)(h) as Subsection (2HD 
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
and (b) in Subsection (1), inserted "resulting ter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Sub- (2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except" 
section (2)(a), substituted "state agencies" for which had read "the final orders and decrees of 
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a), state and local agencies or appeals from the 
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings district court review of them", deleted "not-
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2 )(a), withstanding any other provision of law " at the 
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision end of Subsection (2)(a), inserted present Sub-
of law" at the end of Subsection (2)(a), inserted section (2Kb), designated former Subsections 
Subsection (b), redesignated former Subsec- (2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i), and 
tions (2)(b^ to (2Kh) as Subsections (2uc> to substituted "first degree or capital felon}" for 
(2)0), added "except those from the small "fir^t or capital degree felony" in present Sub-
claims department of a circuit court' at the end section (2uf) 
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